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PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS IN THE 
AGE OF MARKMAN AND MANTRAS 
Craig Allen Nard* 
Professor Nard argues that although notions of uniformity and 
certainty have always been part of patent law parlance, since the Fed-
eral Circuit's decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 
these noble ends have achieved mantra status. In Markman, the Fed-
eral Circuit, in the name of uniformity and certainty, characterized 
claim interpretation as a question of law subject to de novo review, 
thus positioning itself as the arbiter of claim meaning. Although Pro-
fessor Nard disagrees with this characterization and asserts that uni-
formity and certainty are ill-served by such, he concedes that it is here 
to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. Therefore, Professor Nard 
addresses Markman on its own terms. Consequently, to achieve uni-
formity and certainty in the context of de novo review, he suggests a 
proposal to encourage the Federal Circuit to accept interlocutory ap-
peals of district court claim interpretations or so-called Markman 
hearings. According to the proposal, the Supreme Court, pursuant to 
the Rules Enabling Act, would promulgate a rule specifically permit-
ting or requiring the Federal Circuit to hear an interlocutory appeal of 
a claim inte1pretation decision. Professor Nard argues that the Fed-
eral Circuit, which has a special duty to promote uniformity and cer-
tainty, cannot have it both ways; that is, the court cannot employ a de 
novo standard of review on the one hand and, on the other hand, re-
fuse to entertain interlocutory appeals. Furthermore, acceptance of 
interlocutory appeals would foster early certainty and promote set-
tlement negotiations. Consistent with this proposal, he also recom-
mends that a district court, when applicable, apply the doctrine of is-
sue preclusion to its sister courts' claim interpretation decisions. The 
application of issue preclusion would promote uniformity at the dis-
trict court level, and coupled with interlocutory review, would pro-
mote early certainty. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law SchooL 
For their helpful comments, I thank Ian A ryes, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Richard Marcus, Gideon Par-
chomovsky, JudgeS. Jay Plager, Thomas Rowe, and Patrick Schiltz. I also thank Professors Jay Kesan 
and Tom Ulen as well as the University of Illinois Law Review for their gracious hospitality. 
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Uniformity and certainty are modem patent law mantras particularly 
as they apply to approaches to claim interpretation and to ultimate claim 
meaning. Although the virtues of uniformity and certainty were always ap-
preciated in patent law, they have only achieved mantra status in the wake 
of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 1 In Markman, the en bane ma-
jority of Federal Circuit judges characterized the issue of claim interpreta-
tion as a question of law subject to de novo review.2 In so doing, the court 
positioned itself as the arbiter of claim meaning and, therefore, the overseer 
of patent infringement proceedings.3 The only issue that was thought to be 
on the table, in what is now known as Markman I, was who should be re-
sponsible for interpreting claim language: judge or jury. In holding that 
claim interpretation was solely for the court, the Federal Circuit majority, 
based largely on functional considerations, eloquently justified its decision. 
The heart of the court's reasoning was that eliminating the jury from claim 
interpretation would promote uniformity and certainty in patent law. Fair 
enough; but does this attractive prospect require the court to label claim in-
terpretation a question of law with a concomitant de novo standard of re-
view? 
In a previous work, I expressed my skepticism of the Markman I deci-
sion and its progeny.4 Specifically, I argued that de novo review and the vir-
tual exclusion of extrinsic evidence in determining claim meaning is incon-
sistent with legal and hermeneutic philosophy, ignores the centrality of 
patent law's person of ordinary skill in the art and the district court's institu-
tional superiority, and, ultimately, poses a unsettling risk to post-innovation 
practices such as improvement theory and design-around theory.5 In this 
essay, however, I challenge Markman I on its own terms. I argue that if the 
Federal Circuit persists in viewing claim interpretation as a question of law 
subject to de novo review, it should take heed of certain process considera-
tions so as to facilitate the realization of early certainty and uniformity in 
patent law because currently, these important policy concerns are as elusive 
as they were prior to Markman I, if not more so.6 
1. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane). 
2. See id. at 979. 
3. See id. at 989 (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly always to de-
cide the case."); see also MCV, Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 870 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
("[T]he dispositive issue on the merits would be the definition of the invention .... ");Elf Atochem N. Am., 
Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 859 (D. Del. 1995) ("Not surprisingly, resolution of the 
claim interpretation issues often resolves the infringement issue, as it will in this case."); Lucas Aerospace, 
Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329,332 n.3 (D. Del. 1995) ("[C]laim construction more often than 
not determines the outcome on infringement[.]"); Linda Greenhouse, Ruling Curbs Jury's Role on Patents, 
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 1996, at D1 ('"Once you have construed the scope of the claim, that's the end of the 
game,' said a patent expert, Bo Pasternak of the law firm of Choate, Hall & Stewart in Boston."). 
4. See Craig Allen Nard, A Theoty of Claim Interpretation, 14 HA.Rv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2000). 
5. See id. 
6. See William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman: A Prescription for the Tim-
ing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 HA.Rv. J.L. & TECH. 55, 67 (1999) ("Although, according to 
the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, Markman should have ushered in greater uniformity, pre-
dictability, and certainty in patent litigation, many believe that the holding has had the opposite effect. 
This is largely because Federal Circuit review of claim interpretation is de novo."). 
No.1) PROCESS CONSIDERATION IN THE AGE OF MARKMAN 357 
Thus, I propose that the court should be more receptive to adjudicat-
ing interlocutory orders arising from Marlanan hearings.7 In this regard, I 
set forth two proposals that would either entice or require the Federal Cir-
cuit to grant an interlocutory appeal on the issue of claim interpretation. 
To realize early certainty, the Federal Circuit must make a Cfhoice-either 
afford district court claim interpretations more deference or grant inter-
locutory appeals on the issue of claim interpretation.8 The Federal Circuit 
cannot have it both ways; the court may not exercise de novo review while 
refusing to hear interlocutory appeals. Furthermore, I urge the Federal 
Circuit to endorse and facilitate the district court's appropriate application 
of issue preclusion in the context of claim interpretation. When applicable, 
the doctrine of issue preclusion will have a unifying effect on claim meaning· 
consistent with the vision of Markman I. 
Part I discusses Markman I and its progeny, as well as the present de-
sire of certain Federal Circuit judges to remake, if not drastically limit, 
Markman I. Part II.A addresses the issue of interlocutory appeals in the 
context of Markman hearings and proposes that the Supreme Court exer-
cise its authority pursuant to the Rules Enabling Ad to promulgate a rule 
specifically making Markman orders appealable as a matter of discretion or, 
in the alternative, appealable as of right. Finally, part II.B discusses the 
doctrine of issue preclusion and its role in fostering uniformity at the district 
court level. 
7. In response to the Federal Circuit Markman decision, and especially following the Supreme 
Court's affrrmance, many district courts began holding, prior to the liability phase, special hearings to con-
strue claim language. At this hearing, the district court judge hears evidence on claim construction and, 
thereafter, construes the claims in issue before a trial on the merits commences. These hearings quickly 
became known as Markman hearings. See generally Frank M. Gasparo, Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc. and Its Procedural Shock Wave: The Markman Hearing, 5 Jl. & PoL'Y 723, 724-25 (1997); 
Lee & Krug, supra note 6, at 58. 
8. See Lee & Krug, supra note 6, at 68 ("[C)ontributing to the lack of certainty is the fact that, al-
though claim construction is an interlocutory decision, and Markman hearings have become prevalent, 
there has not been interlocutory review of trial judges' claim interpretations."). 
9. The Rules Enabling Act provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to "prescribe 
general rules of practice and procedure" for the federal courts. 28 U.S. C. § 2072 (1994). However, there 
are several stages in the process of promulgating a rule. Frrst, a proposed rule is considered by the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules. See id. § 2073(a)(2). Second, if this committee approves the rule, it is then 
considered by the Standing Committee and, thereafter, the Judicial Conference before making its way to 
the Supreme Court. See id. § 2073(b ). Lastly, if the Supreme Court favors the rule, it is then considered by 
Congress, who may veto the proposed rule. See id. § 2074(a)-(b ). If Congress does not exercise its veto 
authority, the rule goes into effect See id. § 2074(a). For a discussion of the history of the Rules Enabling 
Act, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982). 
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I. THE MARKMAN DECISION, ITS PROGENY, AND THE BURGEONING 
APOSTASY 
A. Markman I: Blinding the Artisan 
Many Federal Circuit judges in recent years have understandably ex-
pressed their frustration with inept or purposively vague claim drafting/0 
the uncertainties that accompany the equitable doctrine of equivalents,n 
and the vicissitudes of the jury in patent casesY Similar to the atmosphere 
of the late nineteenth century,13 this frustration has prompted some judges 
10. E.g., ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Nichols, J., 
dissenting) (referring to claim drafting, Judge Nichols wrote "[w]e are up against what we must realistically 
consider a growing inability of speakers and writers, lawyers, technicians, and laymen, to say what they in-
tend to say with accuracy and clarity"). 
11. E.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Lourie, J.). As 
Judge Lourie noted: 
ld 
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception, however, not the rule, for if the 
public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of patent claims can never be relied on, and 
that the doctrine of equivalents is simply the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly 
available to extend protection beyond the scope of the claims, then claims will cease to serve their 
intended purpose. Competitors will never know whether their actions infringe a granted patent. 
12. E.g., Judge Paul R. Michel, Improving Patent Jury Trials, in PLI's FOURTH ANNuAL INSTITUTE 
FOR INTELLECfUAL PROPERTY LAW 1998, at 81 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. 
Course Handbook Series No. 532, 1998) ("The very unpredictability of jury verdicts not only undermines 
opinion letters, but discourages license agreements and design-arounds, and multiplies litigation -with 
attendant costs in money, disruption and delay."). 
13. In the early nineteenth century there was no statutory requirement to claim an invention. The 
Patent Act of 1793 simply required the applicant to "distinguish [his invention] from all other things before 
known." Patent Act of 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836). Despite the lack of a statutory claim re-
quirement, applicants began to include claim-type language in their patents. These inchoate claims were 
eventually used with greater frequency. Applicants would engage in what was known as central claim 
drafting, whereby an applicant would describe his invention in a claim and thereafter include the phrase "as 
substantially as described herein" or some variation thereof. During litigation, the court would peruse the 
written description and the drawings to determine the "principle that formed the inventive idea or solution 
underlying the claim language." Toshiko Takenaka, Doctrine of Equivalents After Hitlon Davis· A Com-
parative Law Analysis, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 479, 502 (1996). This practice was so com-
mon that when the Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1856), was passed, it was "understood as merely 
codifying the existing law which had been developed by the courts." Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims 
of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 134, 143 (1938). The word "claim" found its way into the 1836 Patent 
Act and, as a result, assumed greater importance. Nevertheless, the claim was still not regarded as the cen-
tral feature of the patent document, even though applicants began to draft claims more specifically by ex-
pending a "great deal of effort ... in formulating claims, and the practice grew of presenting a profusion of 
claims of varying form and scope." William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent 
Claims, 46 MICH. L. REv. 755, 764 (1948). As the emphasis on claims grew, however, so did the ease with 
which a competitor could circumvent claims by making minor modifications to his product, thus avoiding 
literal infringement. The Supreme Court responded to this practice in Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 
How.) 330 (1853), wherein the Court held that a device may infringe a patent claim despite the fact that the 
claim did not literally read on the device. See id at 342-43. Thus, the Court looked beyond the four cor-
ners of the patent claim and established what became known as the doctrine of equivalents. Many viewed 
Winans and its progeny as a threat to the notice function of the patent claim, and in 1870, Congress, for the 
first time, specifically required the patent applicant to claim his invention distinctly and with particularity. 
See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 116 Stat. 198, 201 (1871 ). This new requirement, which came to be 
known as peripheral claiming, was designed to "accommodate the notice function of claims." Joseph S. 
Cianfrani, An Economic Analysis of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13 (1997). It did 
this by increasing the reliability of "claims by the public by limiting the bounds of the patent to that covered 
by the claims and a narrow range of equivalents." !d. at 14. Central claiming was officially dead, and much 
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to reemphasize the importance of certainty and uniformity in patent law, 
and one way to establish these virtues is to champion the notice function of 
the patent claim.14 Section 112 of title 35 requires the patentee to "particu-
larly" point out and "distinctly" claim what he "regards as his invention;"15 
therefore, competitors of the patentee should be able to discern the 
boundaries of the patentee's proprietary interest without lifting their eyes 
from the patent's text.16 
This "movement" ineluctably led to the elimination of the jury from 
the issue of claim interpretation, which, it should be noted, is generally re-
garded as a positive development by the patent barP Reducing the jury's 
like the hypertextualist's atmosphere today, the patent claim in 1870 held center stage. E.g., Merrill v. 
Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) (asserting that the claim is of "primary importance" in ascertaining ex-
actly what is patented). 
14. E.g., Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Michel, J.) 
(referring to notice function of clainrs); Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F3d 817,830 
(Fed. Cir.1999) (Lourie, J.) (referring to notice function of claims). 
15. 35 u.s. c. § 112 (1994). 
16. E.g., Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573-74 ("It seems to us that nothing can be more just and fair, both to the 
patentee and to the public, than that the former should understand, and correctly describe, just what he has 
invented, and for what he claims a patent."); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d 1472, 1474 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) ( Gajarsa, J., dissenting from the order declining the suggestion for rehearing in bane); Hoganas 
AB v. Dresser Indus., 9 F3d 948, 951 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that the function of claims is "putting com-
petitors on notice of the scope of the claimed invention"). In Litton Systems, Inc., Judge Gajarsa stated: 
Public notice of the scope of the right to exclude, as provided by the patent claims, specification 
and prosecution history, is a critical function of the entire scheme of patent law. The notice func-
tion is critical because it provides competitors with the necessary information upon which they 
can rely to shape their behavior in the marketplace. 
145 F.3d at 1474 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting from the Order declining the suggestion for rehearing in bane). 
17. See Resolutions Acted Upon by Council: August 1995-1996,1995-96 ABA. SEC.lNTELL PROP. 
L. REP. 55, 60 (containing text of Resolution 605-1, which the Council approved in Oct. of 1995). Resolu-
tion 605-1 said: 
RESOLVED, that the Section of Intellectual Property Law reaffirms in principle that construing 
patent claims to define the scope of the patent right is a question of law that is treated, by both 
the trial and appellate courts, identical to statutory construction, and specifically, the Section rec-
ommends that the ABA file an amicus brief on the merits in the United States Supreme Court in 
support of the Respondent in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 
I d.; see also 1996 Fall Coz01cil Meeting, 1996 A.B.A. SEC.lNTELL PROP. L. REP. 17, 18 ("[T]he vote [of the 
Amicus Briefs Committee] was 19-3 to support the Respondent over the Petitioner."); Holmes J. Hawkins 
Ill, Claim Interpretation in a Post-Markman Environment, in PATENT LmGATION 1999, at 709 (PLI Pat-
ents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 572, 1999) ("One of the most 
important legacies of the Markman decision is that parties now have the ability to identify and resolve claim 
interpretation issues at a much earlier stage than before."); Joseph R. Re, Understanding Both Markman 
Decisions, in PATENT LmGATION 1996, at 92 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. 
Course Handbook Series No. 456, 1996) ("The patent bar apprehensively read the [Supreme Court's 
Markman] decision and breathed a sigh of relief."); Richard A. Machonkin, Note, Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc. and Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.: The Federal Circuit Gets Its 
Laws and Its Facts Straight, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 181, 203 (1996) ("Both Markman and Hilton Davis 
properly allocate the burdens of adjudication between judge and jury."); William R. Zimmerman, Note, 
Unifying Markman and Warner-Jenkinson: A Revised Approach to the Doctrine of Equivalents, 11 HARv. 
J.L. & TECH. 185, 267 ("Markman ... developed a uniform and consistent inquiry for assessing literal in-
fringement."); Federal Circuit Holds Fourteenth Annual Judicial Conference, BNA PAT. TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHTL. DAILY, July 5,1996 ("[Practitioner Laurence] Pretty speculated that [Markman] will result 
in more predictability where claim construction is involved[,] ... spur early motions for summary judgment 
and ... more settlements in patent cases, [and] ... a swinging of the pendulum back to more court trials and 
away from jury trials."); Arthur Wineburg, What Hath Markman Wrought?, IP WoRlDWIDE, Sept.-Oct. 
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role in patent litigation, however, was only the first step. The court took an 
additional step and characterized claim interpretation as a question of law 
subject to de novo review. Thus, the decision rendered the patent's text the 
principal and, for all practical purposes, the sole interpretive tool- a tool 
that, according to some Federal Circuit judges, is "rarely ambiguous." As 
such, in the name of certainty and uniformity, the respective roles of the 
trial judge and the expert witness have been greatly marginalized, while the 
influence of the Federal Circuit, in tum, has been significantly augmented. 
The importance of the notice function of the patent claim has always 
been appreciated or, at least, understood by judges on the Federal Circuit 
and its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. It was not 
until the 1995 en bane Federal Circuit decision in Markman v. Westview In-
struments, Inc.18 (Markman I), however, that it reached the forefront of pat-
ent law jurisprudence. Prior to Markman Fs arrival at the doors of the 
Federal Circuit; the court was well aware of the concerns of the patent bar 
regarding the susceptibility and credulity of juries in patent cases, particu-
larly with respect to the issue of claim interpretation.19 Markman I pro-
vided the Federal Circuit with an opportunity to address these concerns. 
The principal issue in Markman I seemingly boiled down to one of in-
stitutional competence: who is better able to interpret patent claims-
judge or jury?20 In finding that the judge was best suited to interpret patent 
claims, the Federal Circuit provided several functional reasons. For in-
stance, the court focused on tradition,21 gravity of the decision,22 predictabil-
ity,23 and uniformity.24 This part of the court's analysis was well-reasoned 
1996 ("This decision will greatly increase the predictability and uniformity of interpretations of patent 
claims."). 
But see Donald R. Dunner & Howard A. Kwon, Cybor Corp v. FAS Technologies: The Final Say 
on Appellate Review of Claim Construction?, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 481, 497 (1998) 
("The Federal Circuit's plenary authority over the claim construction process may have harsh results 
in practice and may undermine the juridical role of the district courts in patent litigation."); William F. 
Lee, The Ever Confounding Question of Claim Construction: Markman and Its Progeny, in PATENT 
LmGATION 1998, at 153 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook 
Series No. 531, 1998) ("[The] impact [of Markman], unfortunately, has not necessarily been that de-
sired or expected."). 
18. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir.1995) (en bane). 
19. E.g., Michael A. Sartori, An Economic Incentives Analysis of the Jury's Role in Patent Litigation, 
79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 331,333 (1997) ("[I]n time with the questioning by the patent legal 
community, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit entered the foray and questioned the jury's role in 
three areas of patent litigation [including claim interpretation]."). 
20. There were also constitutional issues pertaining to the Seventh Amendment right to a jury that 
are beyond the scope of this article and not particularly germane to my thesis. 
21. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 978 (asserting that a patent is a written instrument and "[i]t has long 
been and continues to be a fundamental principle of American patent law that 'construction of a written 
evidence is exclusively with a court"'). 
22. See id. ("When a court construes the claims of the patent, it 'is as if the construction fixed by the 
court had been incorporated in the specification,' and in this way the court is defining the federal legal 
rights created by the patent document." (citation omitted)). 
23. See id. at 978-79. 
It is only fair (and statutorily required) that competitors be able to ascertain to a reasonable de-
gree the scope of the patentee's right to exclude. They may understand what the scope of the 
patent owner's rights by obtaining the patent and prosecution history- "the undisputed public 
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and should have ended there, but, perhaps inclined to establish itself as the 
arbiter of claim meaning and to enhance its power to oversee patent in-
fringement disputes, the court went on to find that claim interpretation was 
a question of law subject to de novo review:25 
We ... hold that in a case tried to a jury, the court has the power 
and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of lan-
guage used in the patent claim. . . . Because claim construction is a 
matter of law, the construction given the claims is reviewed de novo 
on appeaU6 
It is important to point out that the court did not have to reach or cre-
ate the law/fact issue to find that a judge is better able than a jury to inter-
pret claims.27 The court could very easily have justified its decision on the 
functional or institutional considerations that it so capably articulated. 
Moreover, by addressing the law/fact issue, the court painted itself 
into a corner with respect to the issue of extrinsic evidence because the 
court was now faced with the prospect of reconciling the use of factually in-
tensive expert testimony by district court judges with its holding that claim 
interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. The court fi-
nessed this issue by focusing on the informational aspects of expert testi-
mony. According to the court, because a district court judge may not be 
technologically savvy, "[ e ]xtrinsic evidence ... may be necessary to inform 
the court about the language in which the patent is written."28 Notably, the 
court went on to admonish that "this evidence is not for the purpose of 
clarifying ambiguity in claim terminology;"29 in fact, "[i]t is not ambiguity in 
the document that creates the need for extrinsic evidence but rather unfa-
miliarity of the comi with the terminology of the art to which the patent is 
record" -and applying established rules of construction to the language of the patent claim in the 
context of the patent. Moreover, competitors should be able to rest assured, if infringement liti-
gation occurs, that a judge, trained in the law, will similarly analyze the text of the patent and its 
associated public record and apply the established rules of construction, and in that way arrive at 
the true and consistent scope of the patent owner's rights to be given legal effect. 
I d. (citations omitted). 
24. See id. at 979 ("To treat the nature of the patented invention as a matter of fact, to be inquired of 
and determined by a jury, would at once deprive the inventor of the opportunity to obtain a permanent and 
universal definition of his rights under the patent." (citing PROFESSOR W!LUAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW 
OF THE PATENTS FOR USEFULlNvENTIONS § 7330, at 483-84 (1890))). 
25. In her dissent, Judge Newman charac(erized this as "classification power." Markman, 52 F.3d at 
1008. Citing the work of Professor Martin Louis, Judge Newman cautioned that "[c]ommentators have 
remarked on the temptation of appellate courts to redefine questions of fact as questions of law in order to 
impose the court's policy viewpoint on the decision." !d.; see also John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts 
and Proprietary Tedmologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA 
L. REv. 183, 209-10 (1999) ("Seeking to expand its ability to regulate patent infringement disputes, the 
Federal Circuit sought an interpretive strategy that would provide it with unrestrained powers of review."). 
26. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. Another area of patent law in which the court has characterized as a 
question of law is "public use" under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b). See Lough v. Brunswick Corp:, 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed. 
Cir.1996). 
27. Indeed, eliminating the jury from the claim interpretation analysis does not mean, as de novo 
review would suggest, that factual determinations are also eliminated. Judges frequently make factual de-
terminations in nonjury trials. 
28. Markman, 52 F.3d at 986. 
29. Id. 
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addressed."30 Because expert testimony is merely to be used as an educa-
tional tool, "the court is not crediting certain evidence over other evidence 
or making factual evidentiary findings. "31 In a seemingly contradictory as-
sertion, however, the majority also noted that "the focus" of a claim inter-
pretation analysis "is on the objective test of what one of ordinary skill in 
the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to 
mean."32 On the one hand, the artisan can be used only as an "educational 
tool"; yet, on the other hand, the court is to discern what the artisan "would 
have understood" the claim language to mean. 
The majority's conflicting language was highlighted by Judge Newman 
in a lengthy dissent wherein she characterized the majority opinion as "un-
workable, and ultimately unjust.'m For Judge Newman, the role of the ex-
pert is indispensable in interpreting claims because "[p ]a tents are techno-
logic disclosures, written by and for the technologically experienced: those 
'of skill in the art."'34 By adopting a de novo standard, the majority denies 
that the meaning and scope of disputed technical terms "are classical ques-
tions of fact" that are most efficiently and effectively discovered at the trial 
leveP5 
The ideological lines were drawn in Markman I. Subsequent cases 
provided those judges who disagreed with Markman I an opportunity to 
elaborate upon their position.36 In turn, an intracircuit split ensued, 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 981. 
32. I d. at 986 (emphasis added). 
33. I d. at 967, 999 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judges Newman and Mayer were also concerned about 
the Constitutional implications of the majority opinion with respect to the Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury issue. See id. at 992-93 (Mayer, J., concurring in the judgment), 1010-17 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
This is not central to my thesis, and therefore, will not be discussed. 
34. I d. at 999. 
35. I d. at 1006. Judge Newman also noted: 
Inventors' usages of words to describe their inventions, and the meaning thereby conveyed to 
persons skilled in the field, are questions of fact, not matters of law, in patent documents as in 
other written instruments. Disputes concerning the meaning and usage of technical terms and 
words arise in many areas of law. These disputes are resolved by the triers of fact, whether judge 
or jury, in their established roles in the adjudicatory process. 
!d. at 1007. 
36. For example, in Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP ChenJS. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996), Judge 
Newman again expressed her displeasure with Marlanan I. See id. at 1579-80, 1584. In Hoechst, the 
claimed invention related to a method for reducing iodide contamination in an organic medium by the ad-
dition of a macroreticulated silver-charged cation exchange resin. See id. at 1577. The claim stated that the 
resin must be "stable in the organic medium" I d. at 1578. In the written description, "stable" was defined 
as that which would not break down or '"change more than about 50 percent of its dry physical dimen-
sion."' Id. at 1578-79 (emphasis added}. The parties could not agree on the meaning of the word "dimen-
sion." Although the court ultimately relied on the written description to resolve the dispute, Judge New-
man was clearly receptive to the extrinsic evidence that was introduced during the trial: 
The parties have provided us with photographs and experimental data, the testimony of the 
scientists who produced the data and interpreted it, and the testimony of experts in the field. 
Markman [I] limits appellate reliance on extrinsic evidence to evidence in explanation of the 
technology and technical terms .... However, we have found it necessary to rely on the evidence 
presented at the trial and credit certain evidence over other evidence, for we are not personally 
qualified to know the scientific meanings of "stable" and "dimension" as applied to macroreticu-
lated cation-exchange resins in organic medium. 
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prompting the Supreme Court to review Markman I in a decision known as 
Markman I/.31 
B. Markman II: De Novo Review Called into Question 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Souter, unani-
mously affirmed the Federal Circuit's holding that claim interpretation is 
solely for the judge. The Court, like the Federal Circuit, based its decision 
on "functional considerations" such as uniformity and the judge's "training 
in exegesis."38 Two additional and related points, however, must be made 
about Marknwn II. The first relates to the relationship between expert tes-
timony and claim interpretation; and the second concerns the proper stan-
dard of review. We will see that the Supreme Court's treatment, or lack 
thereof, of these two issues provided both an affirmation of the Markman I 
majority position and an impetus for the dissenters to push-on. 
1. "Internal Coherence" and the Role of Extrinsic Evidence 
In holding that claim interpretation was solely an issue for the judge, 
the Court addressed the role of the jury in making credibility determina-
tions.39 The Supreme Court stated that "any credibility determinations will 
be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole 
document."40 Thus, while recognizing the value of expert testimony, the 
Court emphasized the primacy of the patent's text as an interpretive tool. 
According to the Court, "[t]he decisionmaker vested with the task of con-
struing the patent is in the better position to ascertain whether an expert's 
proposed definition fully comports with the specification and claims and so 
will preserve the patent's internal coherence."41 
The typical credibility determinations that a jury makes "are much less 
significant than a trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the 
overall structure of the patent."42 The Markman I majority has understood 
the Court's subsumption of credibility determinations "within the whole 
document" and emphasis on the preservation of the "patent's internal co-
herence" to mean that the intrinsic record.enjoys a certain interpretive pri-
macy and, while expert testimony may be helpful, it cannot contradict the 
unambiguous text of the patent.43 
]d. at 1579. Judge Mayer also expressed his discontent with Markman I. E.g., Pall Corp. v. Micron Separa-
tion, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring) ("I continue to think that Markman 
was wrongly decided."). 
37. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
38. I d. at 388. 
39. See id. at 388-90. 
40. !d. at 389. 
41. !d. at 390 (emphasis added). 
42. !d. 
43. See infra notes 44--46. 
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Consider the Federal Circuit's opinion in Vitronics Corp. v. Concep-
tronic, Inc. ,44 wherein the court provided district court judges and the patent 
bar with an interpretive, if not mechanical, road map that, when read prop-
erly, would rarely lead to the use of expert testimony. The court stated that 
"where the public record [i.e., claims, specification, and prosecution history] 
unambiguously describes the scope of the patented invention, reliance on 
any extrinsic evidence is improper."45 The rationale is that "competitors are 
entitled to review the public record, apply the established mles of claim 
constmction, ascertain the scope of the patentee's claimed invention and, 
thus, design around the claimed invention. "46 
2. Claim Interpretation as a "Mongrel Practice" 
The second point relating to the Supreme Court's Marlanan II deci-
sion concerns the proper standard of review for claim interpretation. Al-
though the Court did not directly address this issue, it stated, in what 1 
proved to be controversial dicta, that the issue of claim interpretation is a 
"mongrel practice" that '"falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard 
and a simple historical fact. "'47 This language breathed new life into the 
Markman I dissenters, who, sensing an opening, conflated the issues of ex-
pert testimony and standard of review. These judges, using the Markman I 
majority's own terms, eagerly seized upon Justice Souter's law/fact lan-
guage to assert that claim interpretation involved significant factual deter-
minations centering around the use of expert testimony. Because claim in-
terpretation was not a pure question of law, the Marlanan I dissenters 
argued that de novo review, while acceptable for the ultimate legal conclu-
sion on claim scope, was not the sole standard of review; rather, the court 
should review the factual findings more deferentially. This argument al-
lowed the dissenters to advance what they considered to be a central pre-
cept of claim interpretation: extrinsic evidence plays a fundamental role in 
claim constmction. 
C. De Novo Review Solidified in the Wake ofMarkman II 
In the wake of Markman II, the Markman I majority continued to 
emphasize the primacy of the intrinsic record and the de novo standard of 
44. 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
45. ld. at 1583; see also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1332 
(Fed Cir. 1999) ("[W]hen intrinsic evidence is unambiguous, it is improper for the court to rely on extrinsic 
evidence to contradict the meaning of the claims."); Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 189 F.3d 
1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Often, the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed 
claim term, and in such instances, reliance on extrinsic evidence is improper."). 
46. Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583. 
47. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 47 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
I 
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review.48 AJthough they opined that extrinsic evidence may be used as an 
interpretive tool in the face of ambiguity, the Markman I majority would 
nearly always find that the intrinsic record was clear on its face.49 In con-
trast, the Markman I dissenters were persistent in stressing not only the im-
portance of the intrinsic record but also the necessity of extrinsic evidence 
in claim interpretation. As a normative matter for the dissenters, a thresh-
old finding of textual ambiguity is not necessary, or even possible, before 
considering extrinsic evidence. Therefore, like Arthur Corbin in the con-
text of contractual interpretation50 or his student, Karl Llewellyn,51 the dis-
senters would always admit extrinsic evidence when construing claim 1an-
guage.52 Arguably, from an epistemological perspective, Llewellyn's 
merchant juror is to commercial law what a person of ordinary skill in the 
art is to patent law.53 
48. E.g., Phonometries, Inc. v. N. Telecom, Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Michel, J.) 
("Oaim construction is a question of law, and therefore we review the district court's claim interpretation 
de novo."). 
49. One may argue that the teJ<i of the patent may have been facially clear or the technology at issue 
was relatively simple, and, therefore, extrinsic evidence was not needed. My point, however, is that what 
may seem plain or simple to a judge may actually be understood as more complex by an artisan. We just do 
not know. As Judge Easterbrook noted, "[w]hat seems clear to a judge may read otherwise to a skilled 
designer." In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis C..atheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (Easterbrook, J., sitting by designation). 
50. See ARTiruR LINTON CORBIN, 3 CORBJN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE ThEATJSE ON 
THE RuLES OF CONTRACT LAW§ 555, at 239 (1960) (stating that "usages and customs are a part of those 
circumstances by which the meaning of words is to be judged"); see also Walter Benn Michaels, Against 
Formalism: The Autonomous Text in Legal mtd Litermy Interpretation, 1 POETICS TODAY 23, 27 (1979). 
I d. 
[W]here the Restatement admits extrinsic evidence only in the case of an ambiguity in the contract 
itself, Corbin would have required no such prima facie ambiguity. He insisted rather that ambi-
guity is itself a product of extrinsic evidence, and so would have allowed extrinsic evidence at all 
times so long as it was for the purpose of interpretation and not contradiction. 
51. See Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modem Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for 
New TextUJllist Statllloi)'Interpretation, 87 GEO. LJ.195,228 (1998). 
I d. 
Llewellyn, in particular, successfully advocated the enforcement of contracts with a minimum 
number of agreed-upon terms, at the same time that he and others were liberalizing the parol 
evidence rule to facilitate the admission of extrinsic evidence to prove that the parties actually 
had a "meeting of the minds" on the relevant issue. 
52. E.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane) (Newman, J.. 
joined by Mayer, J., additional views). 
Of course the primary source of information concerning the claimed invention is the patent 
documents. But such documents are directed to persons knowledgeable in the field; additional 
evidence and expert testimony as to their meaning should be the rule, not the exception. So-
called 'extrinsic' evidence ... should be treated like any other evidence, and received and given 
weight and value as appropriate. 
ld. at 1481 (Newman, J., joined by Mayer, J., additional views); e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader, J., joined by Mayer, J.) (stating that "the testi-
mony of one skilled in the art about the meaning of claim terms at the time of the invention will almost al-
ways qualify as relevant evidence"); see also Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) (Newman, J., joined by Mayer and Rader, JJ.) (discussing the importance of extrinsic evidence). 
53. See Revised Uniform Sales Act§ 59 (1941). See generally Gayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, 
and Communities, 61 U. an. L. REv. 1375, 1420 (1994) ("Llewellyn's endorsement of merchant juries in 
commercial cases, for instance, was largely motivated by his sense that merchants alone would be suffi-
ciently familiar with the specialized use of language and practice in commercial contracts to render verdicts 
that accurately recited the intentions of the parties."); Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, 
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Furthermore, the Markman I dissenters asserted that the characteriza-
tion of claim interpretation as a question of law was artificial, and, if forced 
to affix a label, claim interpretation, if anything, was a mixed question of 
law and fact. Therefore, they pushed for a bifurcated standard of review, 
whereby the district court's factual findings would be reviewed deferentially 
and the ultimate decision on claim scope would be subject to de novo re-
view. Needless to say, the Markman I majority, to put it mildly, resisted 
this line of reasoning and an ideological struggle ensued. In the end, the 
Federal Circuit had no choice but to address en bane the issue of extrinsic 
evidence and the proper allocation of interpretive authority. 
In Cybor Corp. v. PAS Technologies, Inc.,54 the views of the Markman 
I majority and dissenters found full expression, but, when the dust settled, I 
the former carried the day. The Cybor court addressed the Markman I dis-
senters' reliance on Markman II's language that suggested claim interpreta-
tion is a mixed question of law and fact55 and stated that these "characteri-
zations ... are only prefatory comments demonstrating the Supreme 
Court's recognition" that the law/fact issue "is not simple or clear cut."56 
The majority in Cybor insisted that "[n]othing" in Markman II "supports 
the view that the Court endorsed a silent, third option- that claim con-
struction may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of fact.''57 Indeed, 
Markman II understood the importance of the Federal Circuit's role in 
"providing national uniformity to the construction of a patent claim."58 
Moreover, according to the Cybor majority, the Supreme Court's silence on 
the standard of review was in fact an implicit affirmation of Markman I's 
holding that claim interpretation is subject to de novo review: "Accord-
ingly, we today disavow any language in previous opinions of this court that 
holds, purports to hold, states, or suggests anything to the contrary, see, e.g., 
Fromson, ... Eastman Kodak, ... Metaullics .... "59 
Judges Plager and Bryson each wrote a concurring opinion. Both 
opinions, although endorsing a de novo standard of review, shied away 
from the law/fact distinction and adopted more of a process approach. 
Judge Plager wrote: 
On appeal, this court has the benefit of the trial judge's consid-
ered view, and the record of the effort n;tade at trial to assist the 
and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, WittgellStein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEx. L. 
REv. 169, 208 n.229 (1989) ("Llewellyn's position on the merchant jury is fundamentally epistemological: 
he thought laypersons were incapable of judging the reasonableness of commercial practices."); Zipporah 
Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REv. 465, 
512-13 (1987) (discussing rationale behind merchant jury). 
54. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en bane). 
55. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,378,388 (1996) (stating that claim in-
terpretation is a "mongrel practice" that "falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple 
historical fact"). 
56. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455. 
57. [d. 
58. ld. 
59. [d. at 1456 (citations omitted). 
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judge in understanding the terms of the claim. Though we review 
that record "de novo," meaning without applying a formally defer-
ential standard of review, common sense dictates that the trial 
judge's view will carry weight.60 
367 
Similarly, Judge Bryson opined: "[W]e approach the legal issue of claim 
construction recognizing that with respect to certain aspects of the task, the 
district court may be better situated than we are, and that as to those as-
pects we should be cautious about substituting our judgment for that of the 
district court."61 
Judges Plager and Bryson appear to be uncomfortable with the char-
acterization of claim construction as one of law.62 Although they both em-
brace de novo review, they would employ an mstitutional competence 
analysis depending upon the nature of the evidence considered by the dis-
trict court.63 These concurrences are important because they try to recon-
cile de novo review with the institutional superiority of the district court 
judge as to underlying factual determinations. Indeed, when one looks 
closely enough, they do not diverge significantly from the position of the 
Markman I dissenters. 
In three separate opinions, the Markman I dissenters, as expected, 
took a more pronounced position against the majority. Judge Mayer con-
curred in the judgment and filed an opinion that was joined by Judge 
Newman.64 Judge Rader dissented-in-part, joined-in-part, and concurred in 
the judgment,65 and Judge Newman filed "additional views" with which 
Judge Mayer joined.66 
In his opinion, Judge Mayer criticized the majority for "profoundly 
misapprehend[ing]" Markman IIY First, he asserted that the Supreme 
Court did not affirm Markman Fs formulation of claim construction as a 
question of law subject to de novo review.68 Rather, the analysis in Mark-
man II was largely focused on the Seventh Amendment issue and the role 
60. Iri at 1462. Judge Plager also showed signs of joining the dissenters' camp when he joined Judge 
Rader's "additional views" in Pitney Bowes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F3d 1298, 1313-15 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
61. Cybor, 138F3d at 1463. 
62. Concurring opinion stating: 
This court's decision in Markman I, reaffirmed today, simply means that we do not spend our 
and appellate counsels' time debating whether the trial court's information base constitutes find-
ings of "fact" or conclusions of "law," with verbally different standards of review. Instead, both 
they and we can focus on the question that the trial court addressed, the question that counts: 
what do the claims mean? 
Iri at 1462-63 (Piager, J., concurring). 
63. See id. at 1462 (Piager, J., concurring); id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
64. See id. at 1463-72 (Mayer, J., joined by Newman, J., concurring). 
65. See id. at 1473-78 (Rader, J.). 
66. See id. at 1478-81 (Newman, J., additional views). 
67. Iri at 1463. 
68. See id. at 1464 (Mayer, J., concurring) ("Though it could have done so easily, the Court chose 
not to accept our formulation of claim construction: as a pure question of law to be decided de novo 
in all cases on appeal."). 
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of the jury in claim construction.69 The Supreme Court, in holding that 
claim construction was solely for the judge, said nothing about the proper 
standard of review.70 Therefore, for Judge Mayer, it is incorrect to read 
Markman II as an affirmation of Markman rs characterization of claim in-
terpretation as a question of law reviewed de novo. Second, Judge Mayer 
asserted that "regardless of the labels we attach to these questions, without 
the benefit of a full record from the trial court, it is neither the function of 
this court nor is it within our capacity as an appellate court to adopt new in-
terpretations" because to do so would deprive "the parties of important 
substantive and procedural mechanisms provided in the trial courts" and 
"would transform this court into a trial court of first and usually last re-
sort.'m 
For Judge Rader, the virtue of Markman I was that it eliminated the 
jury's susceptible and capricious voice from claim interpretation and that it 
thereby "promised to improve the predictability and uniformity of patent 
law."72 Judge Rader, however, believed that the Cybor majority by taking 
or affirming the additional step of characterizing claim construction as a 
question of law subject to de novo review "will undermine, if not destroy," 
the promise of Markman I and Il.73 Thus, he turned the tables on the ma-
jority: Whereas the majority cited certainty and predictability as justifica-
tions for its holding, Judge Rader posited that the holding in Cybor was a 
portent of quite the opposite.74 
In support of this proposition, Judge Rader devoted a significant por-
tion of his opinion to discussing the district court's institutional superiority 
with respect to claim interpretation.75 This approach should not come as a 
surprise because on at least two occasions, Judge Rader has sat by designa-
tion as a district court judge in patent infringement proceedings.76 This ex-
perience, no doubt, influenced his perspective on the proper allocation of 
interpretive authority concerning the issue of claim construction. Judge 
Rader focused on the "functional approach" of Marlanan II and asserted 
69. See id. (Mayer, J., concurring) ("If it had, there would have been no need for its extensive 
exegesis about the Seventh Amendment and whether juries must construe claims that have evidentiary 
underpinnings or whether the importance of uniformity is best served by giving these evidentiary ques-
tions of meaning to a judge."). 
70. Footnote stating: 
Rather than bluntly force the square peg of claim construction into the round hole of fact or 
law, the Court described the questions presented by claim construction in more chary terms .... 
Even a cursory reading of that opinion indicates that the Court meant to determine who should 
interpret the claims, without mandating a standard of appellate review to be used under all cir-
cumstances. 
!d. at 1464 n.l. 
11. !d. at 1466. 
72. !d. at 1473. 
73. !d. at 1474. 
74. Seeid. at1473. 
75. See id. at 1477-78 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
76. See Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, Ltd., 931 F. Supp. 1014 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (Rader, 
J., sitting by designation); Ristvedt-Johnson, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. III. 1992) (Rader, J., 
sitting by designation). 
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that a similar approach "might best clarify the roles of trial and appellate 
benches during claim interpretation.'m According to Judge Rader, a judge 
must "discern the meaning of the clahu terms to one of ordinary skill in the 
art at the time of invention."78 Therefore, "claim construction requires as-
sessment of custom and usage in the relevant art" and an "assessment of the 
understanding of skilled artisans at the time of invention."79 Emphasis on 
"custom and usage" does not mean that the extrinsic record can contradict 
or be inconsistent with the intrinsic record.80 Rather, it means that testi-
mony from a person of ordinary skill in the art should be embraced and 
given appropriate weight. With that in mind, consider the following: 
[T]he trial judge enjoys a potentially superior position to engage in 
claim interpretation ... [because] [ t ]rial judges can spend hundreds 
of hours reading and rereading all kinds of source material, receiv-
ing tutorials on technology from leading scientists, formally ques-
tioning technical experts and testing their understanding against 
that of various experts, examining on site the operation of the prin-
ciples of the claimed invention, and deliberating over the meaning 
of the claim language .... An appellate court has none of these 
advantages.81 
In addition, concomitant to the institutional advantages a district court 
judge enjoys with respect to expert testimony, there is a temporal benefit. 
Greater deference to the district court will lead to early certainty and reso-
lution of claim scope, which in turn, may induce early settlement.82 Accord-
ing to Judge Rader, a de novo standard of review discourages parties from 
settling because they are fully aware of the likelihood that the Federal Cir-
cuit will reverse the district court's claim construction.83 Thus, the Cybor 
77. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1477. 
78. Id. at 1475. As Judge Newman succinctly put it, "patent docwnents are written by and for per-
sons in the field of the invention, not for judges." ld. at 1480. 
79. I d. at 1478. 
80. See id. at 1475. Judge Rader is careful to remain faithful to the intrinsic record. For example, he 
states "this relevant [expert] testimony must not conflict with or attempt to trwnp contemporaneous intrin-
sic evidence from the patent document itself." I d. at 1475. This assertion begs the question: where is the 
line between extrinsic evidence that aides in discerning claim meaning and that which contradicts? I be-
lieve the answer is when the judge, assisted by an independent court -appointed expert, has an understand-
ing of what the claim language means, he is now in a position to determine if the extrinsic evidence is being 
offered to contradict the claim meaning. 
81. I d. at 1477. 
82. See id. at 1475. 
83. See id. at 1477. According to Judge Rader: 
[O]ne study shows that the plenary standard of review has produced reversal, in whole or in part, 
of almost 40% of all claim constructions since Markman I. A reversal rate in this range reverses 
more than the work of numerous trial courts; it also reverses the benefits of Markman I. In fact, 
this reversal rate, hovering near 50%, is the worst possible. Even a rate that was much higher 
would provide greater certainty. 
Id. at 1476. These figures were based on a survey of every Federal Circuit patent decision rendered be-
tween AprilS, 1995 {the date Markman I was decided) and November 24, 1997. See id. at 1476 n.4. The 
total number of cases was 246, of which 141 expressly reviewed the claim interpretation of the lower tribu-
nal (i.e., district courts, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, and the Court of Federal Claims). See 
id. Of the 141 cases, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower tribunal's claim construction, in whole or in 
part, "54 or 38.3%." Id. The appellate court reversed the claim interpretation of the district courts and the 
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majority's readit1g of Markman I "means that the trial court's early claim 
interpretation provides no certainty at all, but only opens the bidding."84 
Also weighing in against the majority was Judge Newman. Her "addi-
tional views" bemoaned the uncertainties brought about by Markman Fs de 
novo review.85 Judge Newman both endorsed the process considerations 
emphasized by Judge Rader and focused on the role of the artisan in claim 
interpretation.86 With respect to the former, Judge Newman asserted that 
the majority's holding that claim interpretation does not entail fact-fmding 
amounted to a "fiction."87 In fact, she posited that the entire "fact/law the-
ory" of Markman I was an "artificial construct" that created a zero sum 
game that enhanced the power of the appellate judge at the expense of the 
trial judge.88 Markman II, according to Judge Newman, "did not shut out 
the trial judge along with the jury";89 rather, the Supreme Court "opened 
the door" for the Federal Circuit to retreat from this false "fact/law" di-
chotomy.90 
Judge Newman proceeded to discuss the benefits of expert testimony 
to claim interpretation.91 Lilce Judge Rader, she emphasized that claim 
meaning must be discerned by asking what a person of ordinary skill in the 
art would understand the claim to mean at the time the claim language was 
drafted.92 Expert testimony is crucial to this determination, and the major-
ity's constraints on the use of such testimony was an "unnecessary bar to 
enlightenment."93 Judge Newman maintained that expert testimony should 
be considered, regardless of whether ambiguity exists:94 
Of course the primary source of information concerning the 
claimed invention is the patent documents. But such documents 
are directed to persons knowledgeable in the field; additional evi-
dence and expert testimony as to their meaning should be the rule, 
not the exception. So-called "extrinsic" evidence . . . should be 
treated lilce any other evidence, and received and given weight and 
value as appropriate.95 
Court of Federal Claims "47 out of 126 or 37 3%." !d.; see also TM Patents, L.P. v. lliM, 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 
377 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Given the frequency with which the Federal Circuit overrules District Court 
judges on issues of claim interpretation ... [interlocutory] appeals would save millions of dollars and thou-
sands of hours of trial time based on patent constructions that tum out to be erroneous."). 
84. Cybor, 138 FJd at 1476. 
85. !d. at 1479-81. 
86. See id. at 1480. 
87. !d. 
88. !d. 
89. !d. at 1480. 
90. !d. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. 
93. !d. at 1481 (Newman, J., additional views). 
94. See id. at 1480 (Newman, J., additional views). "The Federal Circuit's ruling that extrinsic evi-
dence must be restricted unless there is a facial ambiguity in the meaning of the claim is an unnecessary 
restraint on potentially useful evidence." !d. (Newman, J., additional views). 
95. !d. at 1481 (Newman, J., additiona!"views) (emphasis added); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTII, 
CoNTRAcrs § 7.10 (2d eel. 1990) ("Since the purpose of [contract interpretation] ... is to ascertain the 
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Similar to Judge Rader's assertion in Eastman Kodak that "the testi-
mony of one skilled in the art about the meaning of claim terms at the time 
of the invention will almost always qualify as relevant evidence,"96 Judge 
Newman would place expert testimony on equal footing with the intrinsic 
record.97 By considering extrinsic evidence before a finding of textual am-
biguity, Judges Newman and Rader recognize that meaning is a "functionO 
not of texts but of situations in which we read them."98 
With strained reasoning, the Cybor!Markman I majority are forced to 
manufacture legal fictions, whether it be characterizing claim interpretation 
as a pure question of law, establishing an intrinsic-ambiguity requirement 
before expert testimony can be considered, or permitting the use of expert 
testimony only as an educational tool. These fictions were devised and are 
maintained in the name of certainty, uniformity, and predictability; ironi-
cally, however, the result has been more uncertainty.99 Nevertheless, the 
formalism of Cybor and Markman I is here to stay, at least for the foresee-
able future. Thus, the question becomes: How can early certainty and uni-
formity be achieved within the Cybor/ Markman I framework? 
meaning to be given to the language, there should be no requirement that the language be ambiguous, 
vague, or otherwise uncertain before the inquiry is undertaken."); Michaels, supra note 50, at 30 ("For one 
thing, ... the decision that a text is ambiguous cannot be made prior to the introduction of extrinsic evi-
dence."). 
96. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(emphasis added). 
97. In a post-Cybor opinion, Judge Newman, in perhaps her strongest language to date, again 
stressed the importance of extrinsic evidence: 
The panel majority, having rejected the expert testimony adduced at the trial on the ground that 
it is "extrinsic," excludes itself from access to this evidence and whatever scientific truth it com-
ports. 
I believe it is seriously incorrect to foreclose consideration of such "extrinsic" evidence. It is 
increasingly recognized that courts must be enabled and encouraged to receive and understand 
the guidance of experts. The scientific witnesses for both sides agreed as to the uncertainties of 
this chemistry and the ensuing ambiguity of interpretation of the claims in light of the state of the 
art when the invention was made. This court's refusal to consider the evidence of experts for 
both sides ... is not the path to enlightenment on the complexities of polymer chemistry and 
technology. Judicial doubt can not be resolved by exclusion of the evidence that explains the sci-
entific issues. 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 FJd 866, 878-79 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
98. Michaels, supra note 50, at 33; see also FARNSWORTII, supra note 95, § 7.10, at 511-14; E. Allan 
Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALELJ. 939,957-63 (1967). 
99. In bemoaning the "disappointed expectations" of Markman I, Judge Newman has written that 
the Federal Circuit has engaged in "creative de novo claim interpretations" on appeal. According to Judge 
Newman, "[t]his unpredictability in administration of the law of patent claiming has added a sporting ele-
ment to our bench." Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1479 (emphasis added); see also supra note 83 (discussing there-
versal rate of district court claim interpretations). 
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II. CONFRONTING MARKMAN ON ITS OWN TERMS 
A. Interlocutory Appeals: An Idea Whose Time Has Come 
The Federal Circuit has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over ap-
peals arising from patent cases;100 and therefore, the court has exclusive ju-
risdiction over interlocutory orders that arise from the same.101 Although 
interlocutory appeals are not granted as of right on the issue of claim inter-
pretation, the Federal Circuit may, "in its discretion," grant such an appeal 
if the district court initially certifies the interlocutory order.102 However, the 
Federal Circuit, without explanation,103 has thus far refused to exercise its 
discretion and grant an interlocutory appeal on the issue of claim interpre-
tation.104 This reluctance may simply reflect the more general fact that in-
terlocutory appeals pursuant to § 1292(b) are rarely granted.105 As claim 
interpretation is almost invariably dispositive of validity and infringe-
ment/06 however, the court's reluctance to grant interlocutory appeals is 
somewhat curious given the importance of early certainty and uniformity in 
patent law. Moreover, an interlocutory appeal may encourage settlement 
100. See 28 U.S. C.§ 1295(a) (1994). 
101. See id. § 1292(c) (stating that the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction "of an appeal from an 
interlocutory order or decree described in"§ 1292(a) or (b) "over which the court would have jurisdiction 
of an appeal under" § 1295); see also Eiec. Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. Gen. Servs. Admin. Bd. of Contract Ap-
peals, 792 F.2d 1569, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
102. 28 u.s.c. § 1292(b ). 
103. In declining to grant an interlocutory appeal, the court simply cites the legislative history of 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b ), which states that: 
The granting of the appeal is also discretionary with the court of appeals which may refuse to 
entertain such an appeal in much the same manner that the Supreme Court today refuses to en-
tertain applications for writs of certiorari. 
It should be made clear that if application for an appeal from an interlocutory order is filed 
with the court of appeals. the court of appeals may deny such an application without specifying 
the grounds upon which such a denial is based. 
S. REP. No. 85-2434, at 3 (1959), repri11ted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5257; see also In re Convertible Row-
ing Exerciser Patent Litig., 903 F.2d 8n. 822 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
104. As noted by Judge Newman in Cyb01~ 
Although the district courts have extended themselves, and so-called "Markman hearings" are 
common, this has not been accompanied by interlocutory review of the trial judge's claim inter-
pretation. The Federal Circuit has thus far declined all such certified questions. . . . [This deci-
sion results in] two untoward consequences; first, the district court has had to conduct a perhaps 
unnecessary trial; and second, the eventual issuance of a new claim interpretation by the Federal 
Circuit, on appeal after final judgment, has sometimes required a second trial of the issue of in-
fringement. 
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1479 (Newman, J., additional views); see also Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 
2d 375. 377 (D. DeL 1999) ("The Federal Circuit disfavors direct appeals from Markman decisions."). The 
Federal Circuit has made an exception where the losing party on claim interpretation concedes that it can-
not win on liability. See id. 
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b} (1994); Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appel-
late Reviell' of Non-Final Orders: It's Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285, 292 (1999) 
("[C]ourts of appeals decline to hear approximately two-thirds of the cases certified by district courts for 
interlocutory appeaL"); Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1165. 1193 (1990) (asserting that "[m]uch of the blame is attributable to the narrow 
construction given the statute by some courts, as well as the fear that relaxing the use of the statute will 
open the floodgates to appeals"). 
106. See supra note 3. 
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and, at the very least, save the parties and the district comi a great deal of 
time and expense, particularly in the light of the Federal Circuit's propen-
sity to reverse the district court's claim interpretations.107 
Although the district judge, in his discretion, must first certify the in-
terlocutory order on claim interpretation before the Federal Circuit can en-
tertain the appeal,108 the problem is not district court certification. In fact, 
given the de novo standard of review for claim interpretation, district 
judges, who construe claims after a Markman hearing, appear to be more 
than willing to certify their claim construction for an interlocutory appeal. 
As Judge McMahon aptly stated in TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM:109 
(S]o final is a Markman ruling that one could make a strong case for 
routinely certifying an interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), following such determinations. 
Given the frequency with which the Federal Circuit overrules Dis-
trict Court judges on issues of claim interpretation, such appeals 
would save millions of dollars and thousands of hours of trial time 
based on patent constructions that tum out to be erroneous.110 
This willingness is consistent with the three certification requirements 
of § 1292(b ).m For instance, certification requires that the district court 
judge find that the order (1) "involves a controlling question of law ((2)] as 
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and ((3)] that 
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate 
termination of the litigation."112 Although "in practice the courts treat the 
statutory criteria as a unitary requirement"113 to underscore the appropri-
ateness of certifying claim interpretation for interlocutory appeal, it is help-
ful to look at these criteria separately. 
First, claim interpretation is most likely a "controlling question of law" 
due to the dispositive nature of claim meaning, and an "incorrect" interpre-
tation would most likely require a reversal of a final judgment on the issues 
of validity and infringement.114 Second, the Federal Circuit's reversal rate 
of district court claim constructions suggests that the issue of claim interpre-
107. See supra note 83. 
108. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp .. 541 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1976). 
[S]ection 1292(b) requires that the district judge be "of the opinion" that the criteria for section 
1292(b) appeal are met, and vests the Court of Appeals with discretion to permit the appeal. 
Concurrence of both the district court and the appellate court is necessary and we are without 
power to assume unilaterally an appeal under section 1292(b). 
!d. (citation omitted). 
109. 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y.1999). 
110. 1d at 377 n.l; see also 16 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3930, at 416 (2d ed. 1996) ("The advantages of immediate [interlocutory] appeal increase 
with the probabilities of prompt reversal, the length of the district court proceedings saved by reversal of an 
erroneous ruling, and the substantiality of the burdens imposed on the parties by a wrong ruling."). 
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994). 
112. !d. 
113. 19 JAMES WM. MoORE, MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 203.31[1], at 203-86 (3d ed. 1997). 
114. See WRJGHTET AL, supra note 110, § 3930, at 423 ("There is no doubt that a question is 'control-
ling' if its incorrect disposition would require reversal of a final judgment ... . ");see also Note, Interlocutory 
Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 US. C.§ 1292(b), 88 HARV. L REv. 607,618-24 (1975). 
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tation usually gives rise to a "substantial difference of opinion," at least be-
tween the district court and the Federal Circuit.115 Lastly, and closely re-
lated to the "controlling question of law" criterion, an interlocutory appeal 
of a claim interpretation would, more often than not, "materially advance 
the ultimate termination of the case,"116 particularly after a Markman hear-
ing where the parties file briefs, present oral arguments, and construct es-
tablished facts. If the Federal Circuit were to entertain an interlocutory ap-
peal, the issues of validity and infringement would become mucli clearer, so 
much so that the parties may be induced to settle.117 
Of course, the district court's certification of a discretionary interlocu-
tory appeal does not compel the Federal Circuit to hear the appeal;118 
rather, certification merely allows the petitioner to file a petition with the 
Federal Circuit seeking permission to hear the appeal. 119 Although the cer-
tification criteria do not apply to the Federal Circuit, one has to wonder 
what the court does consider when exercising its discretion. It would seem 
that the certification criteria, at least as a practical matter, are as applicable 
to the Federal Circuit as they are to the district court. Yet, as the Federal 
Circuit has not provided a reason for its refusal to entertain an interlocu-
tory order on the issue of claim interpretation, one can only speculate about 
the reason, as Judge Schwartz did in Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc. 120 
115. This criterion is rarely an obstacle to certification. See WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 110, § 3930, at 
423. ("Of the three statutory criteria, the one requiring substantial ground for difference of opinion has 
caused the least difficulty."). 
Id 
116. See MOORE, supra note 113, § 203.31[3], at 203-90 to 203-91. 
Because the courts treat the statutory criteria for discretionary appeals in a unitary manner, they 
look for a "controlling" question that has a potential of substantially accelerating disposition of 
the litigation. Thus a court will require only that the appeal present a controlling question of law 
on an issue whose determination may materially advance the ultimate termination of the case. 
117. See Cybor Corp. v. PAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissent-
ing). 
From the patent practitioner's standpoint, this court's enthusiastic assertion of its unfettered 
review authority has the potential to undercut the benefits of Markman l. Markman I potentially 
promised to supply early certainty about the meaning of a patent claim. This certainty, in turn, 
would prompt early settlement of many, if not most, patent suits. Once the parties know the 
meaning of the claims, they can predict with some reliability the likelihood of a favorable judg-
ment, factor in the economics of the infringement, and arrive at a settlement to save the costs of 
litigation. Markman I promised to provide this benefit early in the trial court process. To provide 
fairness under the Markman I regime, trial judges would provide claim interpretations before the 
expense of trial. Patent practitioners would then be armed with knowledge of the probable out-
come of the litigation and could facilitate settlement. 
ld (footnote omitted); see also WRIGIIT ET AL., supra note 110, § 3930, at 439. 
All of these determinations as to what constitutes a controlling question of law, or material 
advancement of ultimate termination, are compatible with the conclusion that § 1292(b) is de-
signed to permit interlocutory appeals only for the purpose of minimizing the total burdens of 
litigation on parties and the judicial system by accelerating or at least simplifying trial court pro-
ceedings. 
Id 
118. See 28 U.S. C.§ 1292(b) (1994). 
119. See id.; see also In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 903 F.2d 822, 822 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
120. 35 F. Supp. 2d 375 (D. Del. 1999). 
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In Schering, Judge Schwartz noted that the "Federal Circuit disfavors 
direct appeals from Markman decisions," yet the court "has decided ap-
peals from judgments that were entered based on a party's concession that 
it cannot succeed under the [district court's] claim interpretation.m21 Ac-
cording to Judge Schwartz, perhaps the reason the Federal Circuit disfavors 
interlocutory review of Markman decisions is because of "the parties' inten-
sity of preference for challenging adverse claim construction decisions."122 
Judge Schwartz continued: 
[I]f a party must first consent to a final judgment of noninfringe-
ment, it will only challenge a claim construction decision when it 
concludes it cannot prove infringement under the claim interpreta-
tion. By denying interlocutory appeals, the Federal Circuit will only 
hear appeals from adverse claim construction decisions where the 
party concludes its case is irreparably harmed by the lower court's 
claim interpretation.123 
The losing party on claim interpretation, however, will most likely ap-
peal after final judgment anyway-when district court and party resources 
have been expended124-knowing full well that de novo review awaits.125 If 
the Federal Circuit grants an interlocutory appeal, the losing party, after the 
district court's final judgment, will be precluded, based upon law of the 
case,126 from appealing the Federal Circuit's interlocutory decision. Thus, 
significant resources may be conserved, and the parties may be induced to 
settle. 
121. /d. at 377. 
122. /d. at 377 n.2. 
123. /d. 
124. Some commentators have noted that the Federal Circuit's failure to grant interlocutory review 
means that "district courts have had to conduct unnecessary trials and sometimes have had to conduct a 
second trial after the claim is interpreted on appeal after final judgment." Constance S. Huttner et al., 
Markman Practice, Procedures and Tactics, in PATENT LmGATION 1998, at 558 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks & JJterary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 531, 1998); see also Gasparo, supra note 7, at 
761-62 (asserting the Mar/anan hearings "should be held before trial and coupled with a quick appellate 
review of the claim construction in order to circumvent any further inefficiency that may result from pro-
ceeding via a wrong construction"). 
125. Of course, a losing party on claim interpretation will not always appeal to the Federal Circuit-
these parties may settle for a number of reasons or may simply decide not a pursue an appeal. However, in 
light of de novo review and the hlgh reversal rate, it is reasonable to infer that a losing party has a strong 
incentive to appeal. See Lee & Krug, supra note 6, at 69. 
/d. 
[I]t now appears that Markman has had the unintended effect of prolonging the litigation process 
rather than promoting settlement. The uncertainty that attaches to claim construction due to the 
Federal Circuit's record of reversing a large percentage of claim interpretations on appeal often 
leads the parties to proceed with the trial in order that the Federal Circuit may review the district 
court's interpretation. 
126. "Law of the case" is a judicially created doctrine based on judicial efficiency. As the Federal Cir-
cuit has noted, the doctrine's "elementary logic is matched by elementary fairness-a litigant given one 
good bite of the apple should not have a second." Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 
888, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1984). To state it somewhat Jess colloquially, "[u]nder law of the case, ... a court will 
generally refuse to reopen or reconsider what bas already been decided at an earlier stage of the litigation." 
Suel v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 192 F3d 981, 985 (Fed. Cir.1999). 
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I am not suggesting that the Federal Circuit's caseload will not in-
crease, 127 but it seems to me that the court has a unique obligation as the 
self-proclaimed arbiter of claim meaning to hear Markman orders, particu-
larly when one considers that the benefits of hearing interlocutory orders 
on claim construction far outweigh the costs associated therewith. In other 
words, the Federal Circuit should realize that the efficiency considerations 
of the final judgment rule must give way to the salutary effects of interlocu-
tory appeals. To encourage early certainty, the court has a procedural 
choice: the court can either employ a considerably narrower standard of 
review after final judgment or maintain its current de novo standard and 
grant an interlocutory appeal. The Federal Circuit cannot have it both 
ways. As this essay assumes, under the Cybor en bane decision, de novo 
review is here to stay. While I would like to think that my urging the court 
to entertain interlocutory appeals pursuant to § 1292(b) will have some ef-
fect, I am less than sanguine to say the least. So what should be done? 
In 1988, Congress created the Federal Courts Study Committee128 to 
"make a complete study of the courts of the United States."129 The Com-
mittee made the following recommendation to Congress: 
To deal with difficulties arising from definitions of an appealable 
order, Congress should consider delegating to the Supreme Court 
the authority under the Rules Enabling Act to define what consti-
tutes a final decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and to define 
circumstances in which orders and actions of district courts not oth-
erwise subject to appeal under acts of Congress may be appealed to 
the courts of appealsY0 
Congress took heed and in 1990 added subsection (c) to 28 U.S.C. § 
2072,131 which authorizes the Supreme Court to define a "final" decision 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.132 In 1992, Congress added subsection (e) to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292,133 which grants the Court the power to create new categories 
of interlocutory appeals.134 
127. Some commentators have suggested that the "floodgates" concern has been exaggerated. See 
Solimine, supra note 105, at 1193. 
128. See Federal Courts Study Act, 28 U.S. C.§ 331 (1994). 
129. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., 1001H CONG., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITIEE 31 (Co=. Print 1990). 
130. ld. The Committee went on to state that this rulemaking authority "would include authority both 
to change (by broadening, narrowing, or systematizing) decisional results under the finality rule of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and to add to- but not subtract from- the list of categories of interlocutory appeal permit-
ted by Congress in 28 U.S. C. § 1292." ld. at 96. 
131. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5115 (1990). 
132. See 28 U.S. C.§ 2072(a) (1994). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2072, the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme 
Court has "the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in 
the United States district courts ... and courts of appeals." !d. Subsection (c), added in 1990, states that 
"[s]uch rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 
1291 of [title 28]." !d.§ 2072(c). 
133. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992). 
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) ("The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with section 
2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not 
otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d)."). Since its enactment, the Supreme Court has 
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What I offer for consideration, therefore, is that pursuant to the Rules 
Enabling Act, the Supreme Court promulgate a rule specifically making a 
Markman decision appealable either (1) as of right or (2) as a matter of dis-
cretion.135 
1. Making Markman Decisions Appealable as of Right 
This proposal would permit the losing party to appeal a Markman or-
der as of right and would be an exception to the final judgment rule in pat-
ent law. This rule holds that a decision in a patent infringement proceeding 
is final only upon the conclusion of an accountingP6 The as-of-right pro-
posal, however, is not as radical as one might initially believe. In fact, to 
find support for making Markman orders appealable as of right, one need 
not leave the procedural world of patent law or, for that matter, § 1292 of 
title 28. Section 1292( c )(2) creates an exception to the final judgment rule 
and permits a decision on patent infringement and validity to be appealed 
as of right before an accounting is completed.137 The rationale for this pro-
vision, equally applicable to the issuance or denial of injunctions,138 stresses 
the need to avoid the great expense associated with accountings and the 
loss that would result if the district court's judgment on liability were re-
versed. As noted by the Supreme Court: 
The House Committee on Patents expressed the belief that the 
legislation "is needed to prevent a great burden of expense to liti-
gants in actions to determine the validity of patents, where an ac-
counting is involved. Under present procedure appeals may be 
taken from the interlocutory decree upholding the patent but not 
until a full accounting has been made to the court. Under this bill 
such appeal can be taken from such interlocutory decree ... so as to 
obviate the cost of an accounting in the event the case is reversed 
on appeal. "139 
on only one occasion exercised its authority pursuant to 1292(e) by promulgating FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f). See 
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f) advisory committee note. 
135. Although decisions from Markman hearings are presently appealable as a matter of discretion 
under § 1292(b ), I am advocating a specific provision devoted exclusively to Markman decisions. The hope 
is that, while retaming appellate discretion, a specific provision would put greater pressure (more so than § 
1292(b)) on the Federal Circuit to hear Markman appeals. See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text. 
136. See Joho Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros., 258 U.S. 82, 89 (1922) (accounting necessary for "conclu-
sion upon the merits"); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (asserting 
that a decision is "not final until the conclusion of the accounting"). 
137. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (giving the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdic-
tion "of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent infringement which would otherwise be ap-
pealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and is final except for an account-
ing"). 
138. See Mendenhall, 26 F.3d at 1581 n.12 ("We note than an interlocutory appeal from a permanent 
injunction, to the extent that it considers questions of validity and infringement ... is identical in substance 
to an appeal brought under§ 1292(c)(2)."); see alw 28 U.S. C.§ 1292 (a)(1), (c)(1). 
139. McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 331 U.S. 96, 98 n.l (1947) (citation omitted); see also Menden-
hall, 26 F.3d at 1581 ("The purpose of§ 1292( c)(2) is to permit district couris to stay and possibly avoid a 
burdensome determination of damages.");Jn re Calmar, Inc., 854 F.2d 461,463-64 (Fed. Cir.1988). 
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This rationale carries as much force, if not more, when applied to in-
terlocutory appeals of Markman orders. As noted above, interlocutory 
resolution of claim interpretation will materially advance the termination of 
litigation by clarifying the metes and bounds of the patentee's proprietary 
boundaries. By imbuing certainty early in the litigation process and given 
the dispositive nature of claim interpretation, the chances of settlement will 
most likely increase, thereby avoiding a costly trial on liability. Indeed, the 
expense associated with proving or disproving liability will most likely ex-
ceed that of an accounting. 
Moreover, just like liability is fixed after judgment, claim meaning is 
locked-in after a Markman order-immutable for the remainder of the 
trial. As Judge William Young once informed litigants after a Markman 
ruling, "[y]ou've got the claim construction, you're going to have to live 
with it."140 A patentee may of course lose on claim interpretation and win 
on liability, but the meaning of the claims will remain the same throughout 
the litigation. 
This proposal may appear a bit heavy handed, but it may also prove 
necessary due to the Federal Circuit's reluctance to entertain interlocutory 
appeals on the issue of claim interpretation. The most significant problem 
with the as-of-right interlocutory appeal is not the change to patent litiga-
tion it would usher in ex post- that is, in fact, its strength. The problem is 
prompting the necessary rulemaking authorities to promulgate such a rule 
in the first place. The change that I suggest would require judges, who sit 
on the various committees empowered to enact procedural change, to limit 
or remove the discretion enjoyed by fellow judges. This may be asking for 
too much, too early. The most pragmatic approach may be a cautious one. 
Instead of initially pushing for as-of-right interlocutory appeals, perhaps it 
would be best to retain judicial discretion, while, at the same time, making 
it psychologically more difficult for the Federal Circuit to deny interlocu-
tory appeals on the issue of claim interpretation. 
2. Specifically Making Markman Decisions Appealable as a Matter of 
Discretion 
This approach envisions a rule specifically permitting the Federal Cir-
cuit to grant an interlocutory appeal on the issue of claim interpretation. 
Unlike the present § 1292(b ), this rule would be specifically directed to-
wards Markman orders and thus provide the court with a tailor-made pro-
vision. I would pattern the language of such a rule on extant Rule 23(f) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The envisioned rule would read: 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may 
in its discretion permit an appeal from a Markman order of a dis-
trict court interpreting patent claim language, if application is made 
within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does stay the 
140. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM, 72 F. Supp. 2d 370,377 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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proceedings in the district court unless the district court or Federal 
Circuit orders otherwise.141 
This suggestion may seem like a wishy-washy response to the problem 
I identified above, but a certain psychology exists to judging. Unlike the 
general language of § 1292(b ), the proposed rule exerts more pressure on 
the Federal Circuit because of the specificity of the language. The rule only 
applies to Markman orders and its promulgation is a direct response to the 
court's unwillingness to hear interlocutory appeals on claim interpretation. 
If the Federal Circuit persists in refusing to hear interlocutory appeals, this 
reluctance gives reformers firmer ground upon which to argue that the 
court's discretion in this regard should be limited or removed. 
B. Issue Preclusion as a Means of Promoting Uniformity 
Proponents of Markman I and Cybor point to the following scenario 
for application of de novo review. A plaintiff, who received a favorable 
claim construction in a prior litigation, wants to offensively estop a new and 
independent defendant in a subsequent litigation from asserting a different 
claim construction of the same claim language that was the subject of the 
prior litigation.142 Because issue preclusion is unavailable here,143 it is plau-
sible that the two district court judges will arrive at dissimilar claim inter-
pretations based upon their understanding of the extrinsic evidence. A 
more deferential standard of review, the argument goes, may lead to the af-
firmance of these two divergent interpretations, particularly where there is 
disagreement within the technological community as to the meaning of the 
claim language in question. Thus, in the event the subsequent district court 
were to reach a different claim construction than the prior district court, it 
would be appropriate, in the name of uniformity, for the Federal Circuit to 
step in and choose which of the two interpretations should prevail. This 
situation reflects the Federal Circuit's institutional uniqueness as the appel-
late patent court. · 
But the Federal Circuit's uniqueness is largely irrelevant in a situation 
where the new and independent defendant asserts issue preclusion against 
the patentee in a subsequent litigation. Under this scenario, the doctrine of 
issue preclusion fosters uniformity at the district court level. The applica-
tion of issue preclusion in the context of claim interpretation is consistent 
141. Perhaps the best place for such a rule would be in present Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Id 
142. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,391 (1996). 
[W]hereas issue preclusion could not be asserted against new and independent infringement de-
fendants even within a given jurisdiction, treating interpretive issues as purely legal will promote 
(though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis 
on those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the sin-
gle appeals court. 
143. It is unavailable because the new and independent defendant was unable to represent his inter-
ests in the prior litigation. 
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with Markman II. Recall Justice Souter's language that "principles of issue 
preclusion ... ordinarily foster uniformity."144 Thus, the Supreme Court 
envisioned that the Federal Circuit would promote uniformity in claim con-
struction when issue preclusion is unavailable as where the patentee seeks 
to assert issue preclusion against a new and independent defendant. 
The application of the doctrine of issue preclusion in the context of 
claim interpretation is nicely illustrated in TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM. 145 
There, the patentee, TM Patents, brought a patent infringement suit against 
IBM in the Southern District of New York alleging that IBM infringed 
TM's '979, '342, and '773 patents.146 Judge McMahon held a Markman 
hearing147 to construe the relevant claim language of all three patents. A 
few years prior to the New York litigation, however, TM sued EMC Cor-
poration in a separate patent infringement proceeding in the District Court 
of Massachusetts. In the Massachusetts case, Judge William Young also 
held a Markman hearing and construed some of the same claim language of 
the '342 patent that TM asserted in the New York litigation. 148 A final 
judgment was never issued in the TMIEMC litigation because the parties 
settled before the jury returned a verdict on the issue of infringement.149 
Nevertheless, IBM argued that TM was collaterally estopped from relitigat-
ing the claim language that Judge Young construed in the Massachusetts 
litigation.150 Although recognizing that no case had yet to apply the doc-
tline of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of claim construction, Judge 
McMahon agreed with IBM, stating that the application of collateral estop-
pel here "seems self -evident. "151 
The disagreement centered around the "finality" of the prior judg-
ment.152 TM strenuously asserted that the Massachusetts claim construction 
was not subject to collateral estoppel because the case settled during trial 
and Judge Young's "rulings were not sufficiently 'final' to be deemed pre-
clusive."153 Judge McMahon was not persuaded: 
144. Markman, 517 U.S. at 391 (citing Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 
(1971)). 
145. 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (using the term "collateral estoppel" instead of "issue preclu-
sion"); see also Abbott Labs. v. Dey L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667, 670 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (citing TM Patents and 
applying issue preclusion to claim interpretation). But see Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Int'l, 
LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (choosing not to follow TM Patents). 
146. See Graco, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 374. 
147. For a discussion on Marknum hearings, see supra note 7. 
148. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375. 
149. See id. 
150. Seeid. 
151. Id at 376. Judge McMahon stated: 
While this raises an issue of first impression, I conclude that Judge Young's resolution of the 
meaning of certain disputed patent terms following a Markman hearing, at which TM had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the meaning of those terms, is binding on the Plaintiffs in this ac-
tion. 
fd at375. 
152. Judge McMahon collapsed elements two and four because "in this particular case, the fourth 
element (finality) subsumes the second (actually decided)." Id. at 375. 
153. Id. 
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Unfortunately for TM, that is not the law in this Circuit (or any 
other, for that matter). Since Judge Friendly's seminal opinion in 
Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref Co., it has been settled that 
a judgment that is not "final" in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 can 
nonetheless be considered "final" in the sense of precluding further 
litigation of issues that were actually. determined in such a judg-
ment. . . . As Judge Friendly observed, "'Finality' in the context 
here relevant may mean little more than that lhe litigation of a par-
ticular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no really 
good reason for permitting it to be litigated again."154 
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What Judge McMahon found particularly persuasive was that "after 
Markman, claim construction became a separate legal issue."155 As claim 
construction is a matter solely for the court in the post-Markman era, par-
ties, much like TM Patents in the Massachusetts and New York litigations, 
frequently and fully litigate claim meaning prior to trial.156 Therefore, once 
a judge construes the claims at the close of a Markman hearing, "[i]t is hard 
to see how much more 'final' a detennination can be."157 Judge McMahon 
also noted that the Supreme Court, in affirming Markman I, emphasized 
the promotion of uniformity in claim meaning.158 For Judge McMahon 
stated: 
After Markman, with its requirement that the Court construe the 
patent for the jury as a matter of law, it is inconceivable that a fully-
litigated determination after a first Markman hearing would not be 
preclusive in subsequent actions involving the same disputed claims 
under the same patent. The nature of the Markman proceeding is 
such that finality is its aim.159 
154. I d. at 375-76 (citation omitted); see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 13 em!. g 
(1982); id. § 27 em!. k. 
155. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
156. See id. 
157. I d. Judge Young was clear in his finality, telling the parties, "You've got the claim construction, 
you're going to have to live with it." I d. at 377. 
158. The Federal Circuit, in Burke, Inc. v. Bnmo Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 
1999), stressed the importance of uniformity and consistency in claim interpretation so much so that the 
court permitted a patentee to invoke what amounted to offensive issue preclusion against a new and inde-
pendent defendant based upon an earlier non-precedentia/ Federal Circuit opinion construing the "same 
claim of the same patent." Id. at 1337-38. Notably, FED. OR. R. 47.6(b) prohibits litigants from citing as 
precedent non-precedential opinions. However, the rule does not "preclude assertion of issues of claim 
preclusion, issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, law of the case or the like based on ... a non-precedential 
opinion." Burke, 183 F.3d at 1337. According to the court, "the interest of consistency in the construction 
of patent claims would be ill served by interpreting Rule 47.6(b) to preclude consideration of a prior claim 
construction rendered as a matter of law by this court." I d. 
159. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 377. The finality of a Markman ruling, according to Judge McMa-
hon, also has implications for interlocutory appeals. According to Judge McMahon, "[S]o final is a Mark-
man ruling that one could make a strong case for routinely certifying an interlocutory appeal to the Federal 
Circuit, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)." I d. at 377 n.l. However, the Federal Circuit has not been recep-
tive to interlocutory appeals with respect to claim interpretation. As noted by Judge Newman: 
Although the district courts have extended themselves, and so-called "Markman hearings" are 
co=on, this has not been accompanied by interlocutory review of the trial judge's claim inter-
pretation. The Federal Circuit has thus far declined all such certified questions ... [thereby re-
sulting in] two untoward consequences; first, the district court has had to conduct a perhaps un-
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The point to be made here is that when two or more district court 
judges hold a Markman hearing and are willing to invoke collateral estop-
pel, the Federal Circuit's ability to promote uniformity in claim meaning is 
no greater than that of a district court-even if the district court judge ap-
plying collateral estoppel does not agree with his fellow judge's prior con-
struction.160 In fact, de novo review delays certainty, wastes trial court re-
sources, and leads to costly appeals. Ironically, from the Markman I 
majority's vantage point, the characterization of claim construction as a 
question of law renders the determination a separate legal issue susceptible 
to collateral estoppel, thus enhancing the power of the district court judge. 
In TM Patents, the parties in the prior Massachusetts litigation settled 
before the jury reached a verdict on liability so the issue of availability of 
appeal with respect to the court's claim interpretation was never ad-
dressed.161 In modem patent law litigation, the party who loses on claim in-
terpretation will most likely lose on liability, and, thus, the losing party will 
be able to appeal the issue of claim interpretation to the Federal Circuit. 
What if, however, in the prior district court litigation, the patentee loses on 
the issue of claim interpretation, yet wins on liability (i.e., validity and in-
fringement)? Is the patentee precluded from asserting a claim construction 
different from this prior construction? Based on an exception to the doc-
trine of issue preclusion, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Graco 
Children's Products, Inc. v. Regalo Internationa~ LLC62 said no. 
In many respects, the litigation history of Graco is comparable to that 
of the TM Patents. In Graco, the defendant, Regalo, asked the court to in-
necessary trial; and second, the eventual issuance of a new claim interpretation by the Federal 
Circuit, on appeal after final judgment, has sometimes required a second trial of the issue of in-
fringement. 
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., additional views). A 
third consequence has been for a party, faced with an unfavorable claim construction and unwilling to en-
dure a "meaningless trial," to request that the district court judge enter an adverse judgment against them 
thereby prompting an immediate appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 35 F. 
Supp. 2d 375, 377 (D. Del. 1999). In Schering, Judge Schwartz speculated that perhaps the reason the Fed-
eral Circuit disfavors interlocutory review of Marlanan decisions without a party initially conceding that it 
cannot succeed under the district court's claim interpretation is because of "the parties' intensity of prefer-
ence for challenging adverse claim construction decisions." ld. at377 n.2. Judge Schwartz continued: 
[I)f a party must first consent to a final judgment of noninfringement, it will only challenge a 
claim construction decision when it concludes it cannot prove infringement under the claim inter-
pretation. By denying interlocutory appeals, the Federal Circuit will only hear appeals from ad-
verse claim construction decisions where the party concludes its case is irreparably harmed by the 
lower court's claim interpretation. 
I d. However, the losing party on claim interpretation will most likely appeal after final judgment anyway-
when district court and party resources have been expended-knowing full well that de novo review awaits. 
If the Federal Circuit grants an interlocutory appeal, the losing party, after the district court's final judg-
ment, will be precluded, based upon law of the case, from appealing the Federal Circuit's interlocutory de-
cision, significant resources may be conserved, and the parties may be induced to settle. 
160. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 379 ("I agree with just about everything Judge Young did when 
he construed the claims in the EMC action. Nonetheless, I have no doubt that collateral estoppel would 
apply against TM on the previously litigated claims even if I thought everything Judge Young decided was 
wrong."). 
161. ld. at 375. 
162. 77 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
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voke the doctrine of issue preclusion and bind the patentee, Graco, to a 
prior claim interpretation received in an earlier infringement suit ( Graco I) 
it brought against Century Products Company.163 In Graco I, District Judge 
Bechtle held a Markman hearing and construed the claim language in ques-
tion.164 Although Graco lost on the issue of claim interpretation-
apparently the judge gave the claims a narrower interpretation than Graco 
would have preferred- Graco won on the issue of infringement.165 Century 
Products filed a Notice of Appeal, and Graco, thereafter, filed a Protective 
Notice of Appeal. The appeals, however, were dismissed after the parties 
settled. 
Given the prior claim construction, the defendant in Graco II, citing 
TM Patents, argued that based on the doctrine of issue preclusion Graco 
should be bound to the Graco I decision on claim interpretation. District 
Judge Kelly rejected this argument and both distinguished and rejected the 
TM Patents decision.166 One of the key distinctions for the Graco II court 
was that there was a jury verdict in Graco I whereas, in the TMJEMC litiga-
tion, the parties settled before a verdict was reached.167 This distinction is 
important because the patentee in Graco I lost the claim interpretation is-
sue but won on infringement.168 As such, following Federal Circuit prece-
dent and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the court found that "be-
cause Graco won on its claim of patent infringement, but lost on a claim 
interpretation issue, no issue preclusion attaches to the lost issue of claim 
interpretation since it could not by itself be appealed."169 
Although it is impossible to determine what the verdict would have 
been in the TMJEMC litigation, Judge McMahon suggested that it would 
not have made a difference in her decision to invoke the doctrine of issue 
preclusionP° For Judge McMahon, "after Markman, claim construction 
became a separate legal issue, for determination by the Court. "171 As such 
"[a] verdict would not have changed anything about Judge Young's Mark-
man rulings. Nothing more remained to be adjudicated; nothing more to be 
decided on the issue of claim construction. The application of the claim to 
163. See id. at 662. 
164. See id. at 661. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. at 664-65. 
167. See id. at 663. 
168. See id. 
169. !d. at 664 (citing Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1472 (Fed. Cir.1989)); see also Jackson 
Jordan, lnc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The Jackson Jordan court 
stated: 
1n a sense, a party can be said to have "lost" if it urged a broad scope of the claim, and the court 
upheld validity on a narrower interpretation. However, if a claim is held valid and infringed on a 
narrower than necessary basis, the patent owner cannot appeal ... under the first exception to is-
sue preclusion noted in Restatement§ 28(1). 
!d. The first exception to issue preclusion noted in Restatement § 28(1) states that "(t]he party agaiust 
whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law have obtained review of the judgment in the initial 
action." REsTA1EMENT(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 28(1) (1982). 
170. SeeTMPatents, L.P. v. IDM, 72 F. Supp. 2d 370,377 (S.D.N.Y.1999). 
171. !d. at 376. 
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the product was immaterial to the finality of Judge Young's determina-
tions.'m2 
Thus, based on this language, it does not appear to be a stretch to say 
that a verdict of infringement or noninfringement "would not have changed 
anything about Judge Young's Markman rulings."173 Judge McMahon un-
derstands, correctly in my opinion, that a Markman hearing is procedurally 
unique and calls into question case law and procedural rules that were in 
place prior to Markman. 
For example, Judge Kelly in Graco II understandably relied upon the 
1984 Federal Circuit case of Jackson Jordan for the proposition that "to ap-
ply issue preclusion to a claim interpretation issue decided in a prior in-
fringement adjudication, 'the interpretation of the claim had to be the rea-
son for the loss [in the prior case] on the issue of infringement.'"174 
According to Judge Kelly, because Graco lost the claim interpretation issue 
in the prior litigation that previous claim interpretation was "not essential 
to the final judgment in that case."175 The argument that issue preclusion 
should be limited to issues that were essential to a judgment of validity or 
infringement was also made by the patentee in TM Patents. 176 In response, 
however, Judge McMahon boldly proclaimed that: 
[C]ases such as Jackson Jordan ... (Fed. Cir. 1984), A.B. Dick ... 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) ... , and Eastman Kodak . .. (5th Cir. 1980) -are 
inapplicable in the post-Markman era, at least when the district 
court holds a special pre-trial hearing. . . . These authorities were 
decided at a time when patent claims were construed during jury 
deliberations. It therefore made perfect sense to limit the collateral 
172. !d. at 377. It is arguable that in the wake of Markman, the Graco II court incorrectly applied sec-
tion 28(1) of the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS. Comment (a) of section 28 states that section 
28(1) "only applies when review is precluded as a matter of law." REsTATEI'v!ENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGEMENTS § 28(1). If this were the only statement in comment (a), the basis for the Graco li court's 
decision not to invoke issue preclusion would be, given Federal Circuit precedent, unassailable on the law. 
However, comment (a) also notes that: 
!d. 
(Section 28(1)] does not apply in cases where review is available but is not sought. Nor does it 
apply when there is discretion in the reviewing court to grant or deny review and review is denied; 
such denials by a first tier appellate court are generally tantamount to a conclusion that the ques-
tions raised are without merit. 
The Federal Circuit has the discretion, especially in the context of a Markman ruling, to hear claim 
interpretation as an interlocutory appeal. See 28 U.S. C.§ 1292(b) (1994). Although the court has thus 
far refused to exercise this discretion, such an appeal, as discussed infra, is particularly appropriate 
given the "finality" of a Markman ruling. Nevertheless, this is probably asking too much of section 
28(1). Although the Federal Circuit (and its sister circuits) have discretion to hear interlocutory or-
ders under § 1292(b ), the refusal to hear an interlocutory appeal can be based on several factors hav-
ing nothing to do with the merits of the appeal. Of course, what is meant by the above quoted passage 
remains unresolved. 
173. Judge McMahon also noted that "the only reason Judge Young's conclusions were not reviewed 
on appeal is that the case was settled" and that a "party to who cuts off his right to review by settling a dis-
puted matter cannot complain that the question was never reviewed on appeal." TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 
2d at378. 
174. Graco Children's Prod., Inc. v. Regalo Int'l, LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (E.P. Pa. 1999). 
175. !d. at 664. 
176. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 378. 
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estoppel effects emanating from a jury's judgment on issues of va-
lidity and infringement to matters of claim construction that were 
necessarily comprehended in the verdict. That rule makes no sense 
when a court, acting as a matter of law, draws binding conclusions 
about the meaning of disputed patent terms for the benefits of the 
litigants and the jurors.177 
I am not suggesting that Judge Kelly acted imprudently in Graco II. 
There is Federal Circuit precedent and, as a district court judge, he was 
compelled to follow it. In fact, it would have been interesting to see what 
Judge McMahon would have done if she had presided in Graco II. Al-
though, as discussed above, I believe she would have issued an opinion 
comparable to TM Patents. I am suggesting that the Federal Circuit should 
make it easier for district court judges to apply issue preclusion. As such, 
the court should take a close look at the TM Patents and Graco II cases 
and, thereafter, revisit their own precedents, particularly, Jackson Jordan 
and AB Dick. As a general proposition of law, it makes sense for the Fed-
eral Circuit to preclude winning parties from appealing adversely decided 
issues and to refrain from issuing advisory opinions. A Markman proceed-
ing, however, is unique. As Judge McMahon aptly noted, the Markman 
decision "ushered in a new regime in patent claim construction.'m8 Uni-
formity and certainty are the Markman mantras. Therefore, the Federal 
Circuit, as arbiter of ultimate claim meaning, should open its de novo doors 
and entertain claim interpretation appeals regardless of whether the pat-
entee won or loss on claim interpretation at the district court. Of course, 
the Federal Circuit could simplify matters by granting interlocutory appeals 
as discussed in part II.A. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Most would agree that the presence of early certainty and uniformity 
is desirable in any patent law regime. The question this paper addresses is 
what procedural mechanism is best suited to facilitate the realization of 
early certainty and uniformity. With respect to the former, my preference 
would be for the Federal Circuit to exercise greater discretion when review-
ing district court claim constructions, but such obeisance is unlikely. As de 
novo review is most likely here to stay, early certainty can only be achieved 
if the Federal Circuit matches its willingness to employ de novo review with 
an equally ardent willingness to entertain interlocutory appeals of trial 
court claim interpretations. With respect to promoting uniformity, the 
Federal Circuit has a role to play, but this role is limited to situations where 
the doctrine of issue preclusion does not apply at the district court level. 
Indeed, if district court judges are inclined to apply issue preclusion in the 
context of claim construction, the Federal Circuit's status as the appellate 
177. /d. at 378--79 (citations omitted). 
178. ld. at376. 
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patent court loses some of its specialness. District court judges should not 
hesitate to apply issue preclusion when appropriate, and the Federal Circuit 
should encourage this practice. 
